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THE CHANGING WORLD FOOD SITUATION - A CGIAR PERSPECTIVE* 
John W. Mellor 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
Introduction 
Mr. Chairman, members of the Consultative Group, fellow Center 
Directors, and other colleagues. It is a great privilege to have this 
opportunity to present to you a set of perspectives on the world food 
situation. The External Program Review for IFPRI, noting the dynamic 
nature of the global food scene, urged that once every two years the 
Director of IFPRI draw upon the accumulated knowledge of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Bank, 
the CGIAR itself, and other organizations and individuals to present 
information and to suggest conclusions that would be helpful in stimu- 
lating thought and action consistent with the objectives and means of 
the CGIAR system. The Review Team, while noting the need for cautious 
qualification of.economic research, encouraged the Director of the 
Institute to extrapolate research findings to the specific questions 
raised by policymaking bodies, including this one. I will attempt 
that task, albeit with some trepidation. 
This is a particularly appropriate time to take stock of the 
world food situation from a CGIAR perspective. Major changes have 
occurred since the initiation of the CGIAR system and its early years 
of explosive growth. I will emphasize three changes that have been 
with us long enough for their presence to be clearly defined but that 
are new enough for there to be some uncertainty about how to deal with 
them. 
First is the swing from Asia to Africa as the area of greatest 
concern with respect to growth in food production. Second is the 
extraordinary growth in food exports of the developed countries, 
including the emergence of the European Community as a major food 
* Preliminary draft for presentation to the International Centers 
Week, Washington, D.C., November 5 to 9, 1984. I am particularly 
grateful to Curtis Farrar, Leonardo Paulino and Christopher Delgado 
for several discussions of the content of this paper. 
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exporter. Third is the continued existence of massive malnutrition 
and poverty,'particularly in Asia, in the face of major improvements 
in food production growth rates. All three drive home the extraor- 
dinary increase in complexity of the world global food scene over the 
past few decades and offer major challenges to the performance of the 
CGIAR system, I will dwell particularly on the problems of Africa 
which are of most immediate concern, 
The Rise of Africa as the Major Food Problem Area 
Asia dominated Third World food imports during the period of the 
CGIAR’s conception and early growth. The potential size of imports 
into the region and the implications of a chaotic political situation 
consequent to large-scale food shortage in an area with such vast 
numbers of people suggested a clear danger on the food front. We can 
also see now that a major increase in food prices and also probably 
production instability were then in process. The forces of instabi- 
lity not only led to greater concern for food security but also 
focused more attention on raising food production ,growth rates in 
Asia. Fortunately, by that time it was clear that the soils, climate, 
and nature of the dominant crops were propitious for major scientific 
breakthroughs. 
The change in production trends for basic food staples in Asia 
from the decade of the 1960s to the decade of the 1970s is striking. 
The food production and yield growth rates increased by more than one- 
fifth. The.area growth rates increased by one-quarter. It is likely 
that the large boosts in yields favored further investment in irriga- 
tion and increased double cropping: thus yield growth fostered, not 
substituted for, area growth. This substantial acceleration reflects 
the success of modern high-yield varieties and the systems that 
created them. The preponderance of evidence is that the processes 
that produced these accelerated trends are being institutionalized and 
thus can be expected to continue. It is of course important that we 
all continue to work ,to see that this is the case. 
The simply drawn challenge for the 1960s was successfully met. 
The analogous challenge for the 1980s lies in Africa. A comparison of 
Africa and Asia in the 1960s and 1970s describes this challenge. In 
Africa, in the 1970s compared to the 1960s the growth rate for area 
expansion dropped by more than half, the yields did not change signi- 
ficantly in either decade, and the production growth rate declined by 
more than three-quarters. In the 1970s the food production growth 
rate was less than half the population growth rate. It is par- 
ticularly notable that in land-rich Africa in the 196Os, area devoted 
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to food crops grew three times faster than in Asia, while in the 1970s 
the growth rates for the two regions were about the same. There'was a 
sharp,rise in the rate for Asia and a dramatic decline in Africa. 
Tremendous increases in food imports into sub-Saharan Africa are 
readily understood considering the continent's poor food production 
record. With food exports declining at an annual rate of nearly 5 
percent and imports increasing at more than 7 percent, sub-Saharan 
Africa moved in a little more than a decade from a net exporter of 
food to a significant net importer and, extrapolating present trends, 
by the year 2000 imports will be massive. Trade data, which are 
generally believed to be more accurate than production data, are 
generally consistent with the production trends described. 
In focusing on food production in Africa, major uncertainties and 
differences must be faced compared to Asia in the 1960s. First, in 
the late 1960s there was little controversy as to the efficacy of a 
major push on food production in Asia. For Africa now, there is con- 
siderable controversy about the advantage of food production compared 
to export crops (see, for example, the World Bank’s Agenda for 
Action). Second, for Asia the need for technological breakthroughs 
was clear. There was a full expectation that new technology could 
concurrently meet production and equity objectives, and the broad 
outlines of the technological answers were generally agreed upon. For 
Africa, agreement on the nature of the technological breakthroughs 
needed is less clear, and so the focus on a technological answer is 
less sharp. Third, in Africa there is commonly less agreement on 
what regions a food production breakthrough is most likely to occur in 
and less inclination to face the political problems that must be 
solved in order to emphasize those regions. And fourth, Africa is 
more subject to labor constraints than Asia, thereby posing a much 
more complex research problem. Each of these four problems diffuses 
the focus on food production research and must be put into appropriate 
perspective if success is to occur. 
As I expand on the severe problems of African food production it 
must be kept in mind that our base of knowledge, not only of science 
but also of institutional needs, is much greater than in the late 
1960s. Hence today's more serious Problems may Drove more manaseable 
than yesterday's somewhat easier ones, if we djagno 
correctly and apply ourselves. 
The average productivity of smallholder labor infood production 
in Africa seems markedly lower than in Asia. This conclusion is sup- 
ported by some evidence of a relatively smaller cu tivated area of 
foodgrains per labor force hour, compared to other developing areas. 
se the problem 
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The labor inputs for many areas of'Africa are close to those for 
India, but there is much less irrigated area in Africa, the soil is 
less fertile, and less fertilizer is used. Low labor productivity in 
agriculture helps account for the unusually high rural-urban wage dif- 
ferential in Africa. Because the value-product of African labor. is 
generally higher in export crops, it can be argued that it might be 
better for Africa to specialize in these commodities. It is not an 
argument to be dismissed lightly given the generally low productivity 
of resources in food production. 
Four points need to be kept in mind in dealing with this argu- 
ment. First, given the risk aversion common to farmers, the extent to 
which they are willing to put their resources in export crop produc- 
tion is determined by their ability to produce adequate home food 
supplies. Thus food productionand export production may be comple- 
mentary, not competitive; increased productivity of the former allows 
increased production of the latter. Second, a substantial proportion 
,of African labor resources are already in food production. Failure to 
substantially raise the productivity of these resources in food pro- 
duction means leaving large numbers of people in poverty and 
malnourishment for the decades required to facilitate a shift to 
alternative production and distribution systems. Third, and- leaving 
behind the second point, there is great variability from place to 
place in the food production resource base-.,-in Africa." Although the-. ". 
comparative advantage argument against food production may apply in 
some areas, it.seems unlikely in others. Fourth, no government, given 
reasonable prospects of success in domestic food production, will 
import the bulk of its basic food sustenance. 
The possibility of major technological breakthroughs in Africa 
now. seems far less likely than in Asia in the 196Os, if for no other 
reason, because Asian agriculture was dominated by young soils and the 
prospect of good water control, whereas Africa is dominated by old 
soils with little prospect of good water control for decades. In 
Asia, in the late 195Os, when it began to be recognized that a solu- 
tion to the food problem required concentration on the better areas, 
there was little disagreement about that choice in principle or in 
practice in delineating those areas (see, for example, the 1959 Ford 
Team report on India). In Africa, the principle is yet to be widely 
accepted and the difficult task of developing the knowledge base for 
delineating the regions where success is most probable has hardly 
begun -- to say nothing of addressing the complex political problems 
implicit in such policy. 
In Asia, one key resource has generally been abundant -- labor. 
If more labor is needed to raise yields, it will be available with 
only modest reorganization or introduction of mechanical aids. In 
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Africa, laborproductivity is much lower than in Asia and seasonal 
labor bottlenecks act as an unusually severe constraint to production 
growth. It seems that in Africa not only is the productivity of labor 
in food production lower than in Asia, but the number of hours worked 
each year may be less due to the extreme seasonality of labor require- 
ments. Indeed, the simple comparative advantage model to the 
contrary, tight seasonal bottlenecks in producing the basic food 
supply severely constrain growth in export crop production as well. 
To oversimplify, with the exception of countries such as Ethiopia and 
Kenya, Africa might best be described as land surplus in the same 
manner that Asia is described as labor s-urplus. That is certainly not 
to say that biological scientific research is not the answer, but that 
it may be more difficult to focus that research than in Asia. One 
should note that Africa's poor record on food production is largely 
due to the labor constraint combined with rapid urbanization, rising 
urban incomes, and rising remittances to rural areas. These all serve 
to reduce labor input into agriculture, slowing the expansion of area 
cultivated as well as of yields per acre. These same forces have a 
much less negative impact on agriculture under the labor surplus 
regimes of Asia. 
What might we conclude from this analysis about Africa? First, 
the difficulty of the problem is not cause for despair, but only indi- 
cates the urgency of making difficult'choices and acting upon them. 
There is no question that food production growth rates can be great1.y 
accelerated in sub-Saharan Africa. It is worth adding that if we had 
faced the problem of Africa before those of Asia, we would also be 
enumerating differences between the two, but we would be pointing out 
the difficulties of moving in Asia because of the lesser experience 
with those circumstances. 
Second, the elements of truth in the argument for the comparative 
advantage of export crops and the low labor productivity in Africa 
both point to technological change as the basis for improvement in the 
food record. The generally small response to rapidly rising real food 
prices in much of Africa confirms this. Policy changes probably can 
bring significant increases in output, particularly in the export 
sectors and for commodit4es for which output has actually declined. 
But in a few .years that potential, insofar as it proves to exist, 
will be reached and new technology will be the only remaining answer. 
Third, technological research, at least for a major portion of 
Africa, must focus substantially on labor productivity. The urgency 
of the situation calls for attention to all possible means of raising 
labor productivity, particularly during seasonal peaks. These might 
include changes in crop labor profiles, the combination of crops, 
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chemical and mechanicql innovations, as well as basic increases in 
yields. A close integration of mechanical with biological research 
seems called for, as'does an effort to facilitate cultivation of 
larger areas p,er unit of labor. This emphasis on raising labor pro- 
ductivity is of course in no way a call for large-scale farming. In 
fact, since the effort needed is an overall increase in labor produc- 
tivity, not a dualistic pattern of raising productivity for just a 
few, the call is .for small-scale farming. Given the very low produc- 
tivity of labor in food production in Africa relative to urban incomes 
and to labor productivity in agriculture elsewhere in the developing 
world, the improvements must be major to have a significant effect on 
production: marginal changes will not meet the challenge. This 
assertion has significant implications to research allocations. 
Fourth, precisely because marginal changes will not be enough and 
because of the difficulty of the environment, hard decisions must be 
made about research resource allocations as well as about food produc- 
tion generally, as to where the most likely payoffs will occur. These 
decisions must be by commodity as well as by region and subregion. 
The regional choices will also relate to the physical situation of the 
soil and the amount of rainfall; ' Needless to say, as breakthroughs 
occur in the easier situations, research will be needed to push out 
into the more difficult areas. The faster research resources expand, 
the faster that broadening effort can occur. Inthe meantime complex- 
political adjustments will have to accompany these hard decisions. It 
is perhaps particularly necessary to be explicit here: all these 
priorities have powerful political implications and can only be 
effective if implemented through the political processes of each 
country. The problem of regional choices is inevitable, and it is 
already being made in a number of situations but often with inadequate 
information. The foreign assistance community can help to extend the 
capacity to generate and use the necessary information within national 
institutions. 
Finally, as new technologies profitable to African smallholders 
are developed, many ancillary policies must be implemented. The 
extraordinary cost of food transport in Africa, typically double that 
of Asia, means large investments in infrastructure are needed. The 
need is reinforced by the substantial deficiency in food supplies in 
rural areas in bad years, which interacts with the labor constraint to 
reduce the next years output. Although migration of labor in poor 
crop years is no .doubt a factor, undernutrition may prove important as 
well. In Africa even more than in Asia the capacity to provide food 
security in rural areas is needed and that requires good infrastruc- 
ture. Similarly, the inefficiency of marketing institutions in much 
of Africa reduces farm prices by major proportions: reform is essential. 
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African soils are extremely low in nutrient content; hence fertilizer 
must play a larger role than in Asia.' Hard decisions about regional 
allocation of fertilizer distribution facilities must be made. And, 
priority must also be given to complementary policies necessary for 
rapid adoption of new technologies. 
These are tremendous challenges. They are surely more difficult 
than the ones faced two decades ago in Asia. But surely our much 
greater scientific and practical knowledge gives us the capacity to 
surmount these problems over the next two decades. 
The Food Export Capacity of Developed Nations 
There has been extraordinary growth in cereal shipments.from 
developed to developing countries. They increased nearly fivefold 
from the early 1960s to the late 1970s and can be expected to increase 
another four or fivefold by the end of the century. Three forces are 
at work: first, extraordinary growth in commercial demand in the 
rapidly prospering countries of North Africa/Middle East, Latin 
America, and Asia; second, rapid increase in demand in the face of 
urbanization fueled. by oil and foreign aid in Africa; and third, vir- 
tual cessation of growth in per capita food consumption in the deve- 
loped countries. 
Both the import demand and the export supply are large. The 
balance between these powerful. forces is necessarily highly unpredic- 
table. At the time of the formation of the CGIAR there was widespread 
doubt whether the burgeoning demand for imports, particularly in Asia 
could be met. The world experienced a crisis of extraordinarily low 
cereal stocks in the mid 1960s and again in the mid 1970s. Real 
cereal prices .had been trending up in the 1960s and then experienced a 
very sharp rise in the mid 1970s. Now, a decade-later the concern is 
quite the opposite. Can adequate markets be found for rapidly 
growing developed-country surpluses? For almost a decade cereal 
stocks have been large and real prices low. The European Community 
has emerged as a major and rapidly growing net exporter of cereals, 
perhaps rising to 25 million tons of net exports by 1990. In Europe 
as in North America growth of cereal demand has virtually ceased, 
while continued productivity growth has been institutionalized. 
Rapidly growing exports, sharply lower prices, or both seem inevi- 
table. In fact, the dynamics of demand for food, during the period 
1961-1977 is usefully illustrated by the fact that the European 
Community had a production growth rate two-thirds that of East Europe 
and the USSR, but the former was accelerating exports while the latter 
were increasing imports. In this period, food consumption was growing 
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by 3.5 percent a year in East Europe and the USSR, compared to 1.1 
percent in the European Community. In the Eastern Bloc, growth in 
demand for food has not yet leveled off. 
It is not surprising that questions should be raised 'in developed 
countries about the efficacy of accelerating food production growth 
rates in the potential food markets of the developing countries. These 
questions have profound implications to the financing of the CGIAR. 
It is vital, however, to the interests of food exporters to recognize 
(1) that their major market is in developing countries; (2) that the 
growth of these markets is a function not just of the overall growth 
rate in these countries but of the extent to which lower-income people 
share in that growth, because they are the ones who spend their addi- 
tional income on food; and (3) that it is growth in the domestic food 
production sector that spurs broad participation in growth. Thus, 
although it may seem odd, it is to the interest of food exporters that 
agricultur,al production in the low-income countries grows rapidly and 
hence, and I emphasize this, to the interest of developed country 
exporters to foster accelerated agricultural growth in low income 
developing countries. A few statistics will help' demonstrate this. 
For the period 1961-77 Latin America has had the fastest growth 
rate of staple food- production of the major- continental" areas 13.2- .-' 
percent), but consumption has grown more rapidly (3.6 percent). Latin 
American net staple food exports have declined substantially and are 
projected to become negative during the next few decades. Fueled by 
oi 1 revenues, staple food consumption has grown at a 3.5 percent pace 
in North Africa/Middle East (compared to 2.6 percent for production). 
The situation for this period in Asia is clouded by the fact that 
India (which accounts for nearly half of both food consumption and 
production for Asia, excluding the People's Republic of China) 
experienced no increase in per capita staple food consumption, 
although the production growth rate increased. But, for the rest of 
Asia consumption grew by 3.3 percent compared to a 2.9 percent produc- 
tion growth rate. 
Thus, countries with high rates of growth of staple food produc- 
tion also tend to have even faster rates of growth of consumption and 
hence increasing food imports. The relationship is dramatical1.y 
underlined by the 16 developing countries with the fastest growth 
rates in food staple production for 1961-76. They more than doubled 
their net imports of food staples in that same period. 
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The reason for these surorisina relationshios is that accelerated 
growth in a smallholder agricultureagenerates income increases that 
stimulate demand for employment-intensive goods and services. The 
added incomes from such employment are largely spent on food, which 
combined with additional demand from growth in other sectors, easily 
surges ahead of the sr~pply growth in the domestic food sector. These 
relationships hold as long as people have sufficiently low incomes to 
spend the bulk of that income on food. Generally, broad based, 
employment-oriented growth does not occur without vigorous growth in 
agriculture. I will comment further in the next section on the policy 
measures to make good use of these relationships. 
In this context it is important to note the'vital role of acce- 
lerated growth in livestock consumption and the even more rapid growth 
in the use of concentrated livestock feeds. This is dramatically 
illustrated by Taiwan. Taiwan was a net cereals exporter in the early 
1950s. It had an excellent growth record in agricultural production 
in the succeeding three decades, but it now imports 60 percent of all 
cereals consumed, and practically all of those imports are feedgrains. 
As incomes rise, consumption of livestock products rises propor- 
tionately more. And the relatively fixed supply of traditional 
livestock feed is quickly used up and cereals are substituted. Thus 
cereal consumption by livestock rises much faster than livestock pro- 
duction. The critical determinant of the direction of real food pri- 
ces over the next few decades is the set of forces determining demand 
for livestock feed in the developing countries and the Soviet Bloc. 
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Food Production and Poverty Alleviation 
While the most difficult food production problems are now in 
Africa, the most massive poverty is still in Asia. In Asia, cereal 
production growth rates have accelerated and commercial imports of 
cereals have grown, but poverty has persisted. Although the role of 
cost-decreasing food production technology is central to the processes 
of poverty abatement, there is much that can be done to increase the 
effectiveness of such technology in reducing poverty. The role of the 
CGIAR is important and pervasive in these processes. 
The two most powerful forces for poverty reduction in developing 
countries are increased food production and declin.ing food prices. 
Each plays a role in increasing the real income of low-income people. 
The only way both can occur simultaneously is through cost-decreasing 
technological change in agriculture. Radical redistribution of income 
without such technological change in agriculture will tend to force 
food prices up or sharply increase the import bill: the former taking 
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away with the right hand what the left has given, while the latter may 
be difficult to finance. Thus a redistribution of income without 
sharply increased food production is unlikely to be sustainable. The 
rapid growth of rural populations adds greatly to the urgency of 
achieving accelerated growth in food production if poverty is to be 
reduced. 
Increased food production without increased employment of the 
poor will tend to distribute benefits to the poor through lower prices, 
but those lower prices may stifle the very technological change that 
provides the increased food supplies. Thus it is important that the 
employment multipliers nascent in food production growth be fully 
realized. Unfortunately, how public policy can assist in these pro- 
cesses is one of the least understood aspects of development policy. 
However, we have a reasonable basis for the following hypotheses. 
First, infrastructure development (such as roads, electrification, and 
communication) seems to be important in encouraging local employment 
linkages from income-raising technological change inagriculture. 
These of course also facilitate growth in agriculture itself. Second, 
although institutional credit has probably not generally played an 
important role in the growth of these employment-intensive rural acti- 
vities, it might be able to accelerate those processes, and if so, it 
will have to be l.argely for -operating ca-pi-tal- rather th-an-for -fi-xed---- .-.- 
capital. Third, services are probably also an important component of 
rapid growth of rural employment and should be encouraged. Fourth, 
livestock, fruit, and vegetable products are likely to be an espe- 
cially important source of increased rural employment as incomes rise, 
but they require special measures to provide technology, marketing, 
and financing. Without such attention they are apt to be choked off 
at great loss of employment. 
Two further points should be made about livestock. The 
underlying production economics suggest a large employment potential 
but we observe an all too common tendency to use hiqhly capital- 
intensive methods. of production. Rapid growth in livestock production 
offers an opportunity for rapid growth in the market for "inferior" 
goods (such as barley, sorghum, and cassava), which are-often produced 
by the very poorest farmers and which face inelastic demand and 
declining prices in the face of productivity-increasing technology. 
Thus we need substantial attention to development and application of 
appropriat,e livestock technology to meet rapidly growing demand with . 
. high employment content production. 
Thus if an impact is to be made on the immense poverty problem of 
Asia, two points must be emphasiied. 
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Most important, the pace of technological change must be main- 
tained or even accelerated. Continued rapid growth in irrigated area 
is essential as well.as research to protect past gains and to provide 
further gains. 
Second, if downward pressure on prices occurs, efforts must be 
redoubled to increase effective demand for food by raising the real 
income of the poor through accelerated growth in employment. It is 
urgent that tie expand our knowledge of these processes so that tech- 
nological change in food production can be accompanied by the 
appropriate policies for translating that change into increased bene- 
fits to the poor. 
Conclusion 
I would put a very brief ending to an all-too-terse paper. 
Improved technology is essential to meeting Africa's immense problems, 
to creating enlarged markets for agricultural exports of developed 
countries by accelerating grdwth in employment and demand that grows 
out of agricultural success, and to solving the problems of poverty by 
providing low-cost food and remunerative employment through direct and 
indirect influences. It is the challenge of the CGIAR to diagram and 
practice an effective strategy for developing such technology in 
consort with our colleagues in the national systems. 
